R. Mark Isaac

Biography

Mark Isaac, Ph.D. earned his doctorate in Social Sciences from the California Institute of Technology in 1981. Dr. Isaac has been at FSU since 2001, where he is the John and Hallie Quinn Eminent Scholar. His research interests are primarily in experimental methods in areas such as public goods, law and economics, and industrial organization. He has served as Department Chair at the University of Arizona and FSU.

Awards & Honors

Burning Spear Guardian of the Flame (2012)

Research Activities

Research Interests: Industrial Organization, Government Regulation, Public Goods, Land Assembly, Risk Aversion

Selected Publications

“Risky Curves: On The Empirical Failure of Expected Utility,” co-authored with Daniel Friedman, Duncan James, and Shyam Sunder (London: Routledge, 2014).

Philip Solimine and R. Mark Isaac, “Reputation and Market Structure In Experimental Platforms,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 205:528-559, 2023.

R. Mark Isaac, Douglas A. Norton, and Svetlana Pevnitskaya, “A New Experimental Mechanism To Investigate Polarized Demands For Public Goods: The Effects Of Censoring,” Experimental Economics 22: 585-609, 2019.

R. Mark Isaac, Carl Kitchens, and Javier E. Portillo, “Can Buyer ‘Mobility’ Reduce Failures in Land Assembly?” Journal of Urban Economics 95: 16-30, 2016.

T.K. Ahn, R. Mark Isaac, and Timothy C. Salmon, “Coming and Going: Experiments on Endogenous Group Sizes for Excludable Public Goods,” Journal of Public Economics 93: 336-351, 2009.

R. Mark Isaac and Kurt Schnier, “Silent Auctions in the Field and in the Laboratory,” Economic Inquiry 43: 715-733, 2005.

“Robustness of the Incentive Compatible Combinatorial Auction,” (with Duncan James). Experimental Economics 3 (31-53), 2000.

“Asset Market Efficiency: The Effects of Tournament Incentives for Individuals,” (with Duncan James). American Economic Review 90: 995-1004, 2000.

“Just Who Are You Calling Risk Averse?” (with Duncan James). Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 20,2: 177-187, 2000.

“Group Size and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence Utilizing Very Large Groups,” (with James M Walker and Arlington Williams), Journal of Public Economics 54:1-36 (1994).

“Institutional Framing and Perceptions of Fairness,” (with Deborah Mathieu and Edward E. Zajac). Constitutional Political Economy 2: 329-370 (1991).

“Price Cap Regulation: A Case Study of Some Pitfalls of Implementation.” Journal of Regulatory Economics.3:193-210 (June, 1991).

“Schumpeterian Competition in Experimental Markets,” (with Stanley Reynolds). Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 17:59-100 (1992).

“Theories and Tests of Blind Bidding in Sealed Bid Auctions,” (with Robert Forsythe and Thomas Palfrey). RAND Journal of Economics, Summer 1989.

“The Assurance Problem in a Laboratory Market” (with James M. Walker and David Schmidtz). Public Choice 62:217-236, 1989.

“Appropriability and Market Structure in a Stochastic Invention Model,” (with Stanley S. Reynolds). Quarterly Journal of Economics 103:647-672 (1988).

“Group Size Hypotheses of Public Goods Provision: An Experimental Examination” (with James M. Walker). Quarterly Journal of Economics 103: 179-199 (1988).

“In Search of the Winner’s Curse,” (with James Cox). Economic Inquiry 22: 579-592.

“Market Contestability in the Presence of (Sunk) Entry Costs,” (with Don Coursey, Margaret Luke, and Vernon Smith). RAND Journal of Economics, Spring 1984.

“Divergent Expectations on Free Riding: An Experimental Examination of Possible Explanations,” (with James Walker and Susan Thomas). Public Choice 43, 1984.

“Natural Monopoly and Contested Markets: Some Experimental Results,” (with Don Coursey and Vernon Smith). Journal of Law and Economics, April 1984.

“Public Goods Provision in an Experimental Environment,” (with Kenneth McCue and Charles Plott). Journal of Public Economics 26, 1985.

“The Allocation of Landing Rights by Unanimity Among Competitors,” (with David Grether and Charles Plott). American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, May 1981.

“Fuel Cost Adjustment Mechanisms and the Regulated Utility Facing Uncertain Fuel Prices.” Bell Journal of Economics 13, Spring 1982.

“Price Controls and the Behavior of Auction Markets: An Experimental Examination,” (with Charles Plott). American Economic Review 71, No.3:¬ 448-459, June 1981.

“Cooperative Game Models of the Influence of the Closed Rule in Three Person, Majority-Rule Committees: Theory and Experiment,” (with Charles Plott) in Game Theory and Politics, Peter Ordeshook, ed., (New York: NYU Press, 1978).